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Privatization And The Democracy Problem In
Globalization: Making Markets More
Accountable Through Administrative Law
Alfred C. Aman Jr.
Abstract
This Article analyzes the privatization of traditional government services by placing such
changes in governance in a global context. Looking into what domestic institutions have to do
with the global economy, this Article argues that the privatization of governmental services is very
much a piece with deregulatory trends in the United States and elsewhere in which state-centered
approaches to a variety of regulatory problems increasingly have given way to markets and market
discourses at all levels of government. This Article then considers the effects of such privatization
trends on the public/private distinction itself, and its implications for democracy in general. This
Article comes to the conclusion that we must reform our domestic legal procedures and approaches
to issues in order to ensure democratic participation in decisions that have broad societal effects
and that involve public and private aspects. The local politics of administrative governance can
help shape and transform the law, locally and globally, in important ways. The reforms suggested
here can help mitigate some aspects of a democracy deficit, thereby helping to shape a politics that
affects issues that can no longer be understood solely in domestic terms.
PRIVATIZATION AND THE DEMOCRACY
PROBLEM IN GLOBALIZATION: MAKING
MARKETS MORE ACCOUNTABLE THROUGH
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Alfred C. Aman Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
In this article I will analyze the privatization of traditional gov-
ernment services by placing such changes in governance in a global
context. The connections between, for example, private prisons
and globalization may appear, at first, somewhat tenuous. What,
after all, do such intensely domestic institutions as prisons have to
do with the global economy? I address this question in a three-part
discussion. I will argue in Part I that the privatization of govern-
mental services is very much of a piece with deregulatory trends in
the United States and elsewhere in which state-centered ap-
proaches to a variety of regulatory problems increasingly have
given way to markets and market discourses at all levels of
government.1
The reasons for the shift from states to markets are many and
complex.2 They involve much more than simply a cyclical swing of
the regulatory pendulum from liberal to conservative. Rather, this
shift in perspective and the fundamental ways in which government
conceives of and then carries out its responsibilities is closely tied
to how decision makers at all levels of the public and private sec-
tors conceptualize globalization. The privatization of governmen-
tal services resonates with primarily an economic conception of
* Dean and Roscoe C. O'Byrne Professor of Law, Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington. I wish to thank Professors John Applegate, Yvonne Cripps, and
Carol Greenhouse for their comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Beth Caseman
('01) and Paul Durkes ('02) for their superb research assistance.
1. E.g., Symposium, Project: Privatization: The Global Scale-Back of Government
Involvement in National Economies, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 435 (1996); see also JANE
KELSEY, ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALISM (Arthur Lipow ed., 1995) (analyzing the eco-
nomic fundamentalism that took place in New Zealand). See generally THE PROVINCE
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Michael Taggart ed., 1997) (collecting articles analyzing
the "theory and practice of and potential for privatization of the world's economies").
2. See SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE 46 (Steve Smith et al. eds.,
1996); SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL 28 (1996); Alfred C. Aman Jr., The Global-
izing State: A Future Oriented Perspective on the Public/Private Distinction, Federal-
ism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 780-91 (1998).
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globalization based on markets and the competition they engender.
These markets differ and often can be seen as more metaphorical
than real. They are more often an alternative form of regulation
than a substitution of something "wholly private" for what once
was "wholly public."
Part II will consider the effects of such privatization trends on
the public/private distinction itself, and its implications for democ-
racy in general. The "democracy problem" under globalization in-
volves the diminishment of transparency, public participation, and
the information flows necessary to make public participation influ-
ential. This problem arises from the disjunction between global ec-
onomic and political processes on the one hand, and local
processes of democratic participation on the other. The global
economy and the competition it engenders encourage cost-cutting
on the part of both private and public sectors. When cost-cutting
occurs by way of privatization in the public sector, however, the
democracy problem can intensify, particularly when some ap-
proaches that delegate regulation to markets treat these markets as
essentially "private," and the actions individuals take pursuant to
market forces as voluntary or, in effect, merely administrative.
Such an approach can undercut substantially public involvement in
various policy-making processes.3 Even more important, the infor-
mation that can make public participation meaningful no longer
may be available when government services are privatized.4
3. Mark Aronson, A Public Lawyer's Responses to Privatisation and Outsourcing,
in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 40-70 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997) (argu-
ing that one cannot fully separate administration from government or policy making).
For a discussion of different approaches to the relationship of the market to regula-
tion, including (1) the complete substitution of a market for regulation, (2) the market
as a regulatory tool, and (3) the delegation of public functions to the market, see
Aman, supra note 2, at 820-37.
4. This is especially true when the private nature of the entities involved means
that state or federal freedom of information laws may not apply. See Forsham v. Har-
ris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980) (holding the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1994), inapplicable to private grantees of federal money who were neither agencies
of the federal government or controlled by it).
One of the by-products of regulation at all levels is the information flow that re-
sults. Alfred C. Aman Jr., Deregulation in the United States: Transition to the Promised
Land, a New Regulatory Paradigm, or Back to the Future?, in THE LIBERALIZATION
OF STATE MONOPOLIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND, 263, 294, 305
(Damien Geradin ed., 2000). For example, the regulation of electricity rates results
from the natural monopoly characteristics of the utilities involved. Id. at 297. To prop-
erly regulate rates, regulators require a good deal of pricing information and market
analyses, including alternative rates of return and the like. Id. at 302. When such enti-
ties are privatized or deregulated, even if only at the generation level of electricity,
information can become more difficult to collect in a timely manner and, in any event,
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As I also note in Part II, there are many types of markets and
various forms of democracy. New procedural approaches to deci-
sion making are necessary to make different kinds of markets ap-
propriately accountable to citizens. To this end, I discuss various
forms of public participation or democracy, including shareholder
democracy, consumer democracy, and administrative democracy.
To help explain how certain markets and forms of democracy are
best matched, I develop the concept of "global currency." I argue
that the more metaphorical the markets involved are, the more
need there may be for public participation in decision making, lest
illegitimate forms of currency be used in the various global eco-
nomic competitions now underway.
Finally, in conclusion, I suggest that two related ideas are signifi-
cant to understand fully the relationship of globalization to democ-
racy: global citizenship and a global public interest. Making some
domestic markets more accountable to. the public can mitigate a
significant externality of globalization-the "democracy deficit"-
but global processes also can help shape and influence domestic
law trends as well. Processes that are linked to a politics that tran-
scends our own local views offer the possibility of new ideas and
new avenues of change. Processes at the local level can link up
with networks and political movements that transcend the local
and introduce new ideas as well as external sources of political
pressure on local majorities. New networks and new ideas can en-
rich as well as engender a more globally conscious discourse at the
local level.
I. GLOBALIZATION AND MARKETS
"Globalization" is a term of art used to mean many things-from
traditional notions of internationalization, 5 to Americanization, 6 to
be fragmentary in its availability. Id. at 294, 305. For a discussion of deregulation in
the United States in three different industries, the impact of various legislative ap-
proaches to competition, and the flow of information these approaches either created
or eliminated, see id. at 263-306.
5. E.g., DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS 52-58 (1999) (distin-
guishing internationalization and transnationalization). For a discussion of the various
ways in which the term "globalization" is used, see Alfred C. Aman Jr., Proposals for
Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act: Globalization, Democracy, and the Fur-
therance of a Global Public Interest, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 397, 404-10
(1999) [hereinafter Aman, Proposals for Reforming the Administrative Procedure
Act].
For an analysis of the relationship of globalization to international law, see Jost
Delbrlck, The Role of the United Nations in Dealing with Global Problems, 4 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 277 (1997). See also Stephan Hobe, Global Challenges to State-
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an all encompassing notion of "world-wide." 7 My own reference is
to dynamic and highly concrete legal, economic, and social
processes that, in effect, denationalize public and private ap-
proaches to the conception and resolution of problems and the ad-
vancement of economic opportunities.8 Whether the issue is
environmental pollution or the most efficient manner of manufac-
turing and distributing automobiles or running shoes, governmen-
tal boundary lines at all levels are decreasing in importance in
terms of the way such problems and their profit-making possibili-
ties are conceptualized and carried out.9 Traditional, nation-state
centered regulation is often in conflict with this way of doing busi-
ness and resolving problems. When this occurs, globalization al-
most invariably is associated with private markets and market-
based approaches. 10 In and of itself, however, globalization does
hood. The Increasingly Important Role of Nongovernmental Organizations, 5 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191 (1997). For an analysis of deregulation in the United
States as an aspect of the processes of globalization, see ALFRED C. AMAN JR., AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA 8-24 (1992) [hereinafter AMAN, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA].
6. E.g., Philip Allott, The True Function of Law in the International Community,
6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 391 (1998).
7. E.g., RICHARD O'BRIEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 5 (1992) ("A
truly global service knows no internal boundaries, can be offered throughout the
globe, and pay scant attention to national aspects .... The closer we get to a global,
integrated whole, the closer we get to the end of geography.").
8. Jost Delbruck, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for
Domestic Law-A European Perspective, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9 (1993);
see also PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: THE INTERNALIZATION OF ECONOMIC AC-
TIVITY 1-8 (2d ed. 1992) (1986) (analyzing the process of globalization resulting from
the interactions between states and corporations); WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD,
READY OR NOT (1997); KENICHI OHMAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD (1990); SASKIA
SASSEN, CITIES IN A WORLD ECONOMY (Charles Ragin et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000); SAS-
KIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY (1991) [hereinafter SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY]; Al-
fred C. Aman Jr., The Earth As Eggshell Victim: A Global Perspective on Domestic
Regulation, 102 YALE L.J. 2107 (1993); Alfred C. Aman Jr., The Globalization of
Law, Politics, and Markets: Implications for Domestic Law Reform, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1993); Saskia Sassen, Towards A Feminist Analytics of the Global
Economy, 4 IND J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 7 (1996).
9. Aman, supra note 2, at 781; see also DICKEN, supra note 8, at 47-59. See gener-
ally ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS (1991).
Transnational corporations decide where it is most cost effective to locate
various activities in the value chains connected with the production and mar-
keting of goods and services. They may locate research and development in
one country, component assembly in another, final assembly in yet another
country, and distribution networks in yet another.
Aman, supra note 2, at 781.
10. Focusing on the economic aspects of trade to the exclusion of the environmen-
tal values is exemplified by the World Trade Organization ("WTO") in its recent re-
port on the United States law prohibiting certain shrimp and shrimp products. WTO
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not necessarily militate totally in favor of markets or a hands-off
governmental approach to the externalities of globalization. The
state can play a role; however, for many reasons, that role cannot
result in traditional command-control regulation. Indeed, the mul-
tiplicity of jurisdictions involved, the inability of any one govern-
mental unit to solve global problems on its own, as well as the
incentives to retain current industry and attract new investment
and jobs are all significant factors in fueling competition in state-
centered regulation itself, whether it is regulatory,"' economic, 12 or
cultural.' 3 The various forms in which these competitions occur are
what I call "global currencies." Competition in these arenas yields,
at best, a cost-effective approach to the issue at hand and, at worst,
a least common denominator resolution of the issue involved.
Races to the top, middle, and the bottom are all possible 14 and new
mixes of public and private power emerge. Different kinds of mar-
kets or market approaches thus result, raising different problems
concerning fairness, transparency, and the creation of legitimate
and illegitimate forms of global currency. Indeed, how one concep-
tualizes and applies the public/private distinction can have a great
deal to do with the extent to which the public has a role in deciding
what kinds of currencies are available for use in competitions in
various economic, regulatory, or cultural arenas.
A. Defining Global Currency
The idea of "global currency" is helpful in defining when activi-
ties might best be viewed as public, no matter the identity of the
actors involved. Global currency is, in effect, the price government
is willing to pay to remain economically competitive on behalf of
the residents already living and investing within its jurisdiction, as
well as to be attractive to new investors of all kinds. The most
common form of currency is money, generated from the provision
Dispute Panel Report on Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
May 15, 1998, WT/DS58/R, available at 1998 WTO DS LEXIS 14. "Even though the
situation of [endangered] turtles is a serious one, we consider that the United States
adopted measures which, irrespective of their environmental purpose, were clearly a
threat to the multilateral trading system." Id. at § 7.61.
11. Debora L. Spar & David B. Yoffie, A Race to the Bottom or Governance From
the Top?, in COPING WITH GLOBALIZATION 31 (Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey A. Hart
eds., 2000).
12. E.g., THE GROUP OF LISBON, LIMITS TO COMPETITION (1995) (describing the
new, emerging era of global competition).
13. Arjun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,
in GLOBAL CULTURE 295 (Mike Featherstone ed., 1990).
14. See Appadurai, supra note 13; see also DAVID VOGEL, TRADING Up (1995).
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of fewer or more efficiently provided governmental services or
both, lower taxes, and lower regulatory costs, as well as invest-
ments in the infrastructures and human capital necessary to create,
stimulate, and sustain economic growth. 15
Not all forms of global currency are legitimate. If, for example, a
competitive edge for a particular governmental/economic unit in-
cludes money saved on privatizing prisons and those savings flow,
in part, from the fact that private prisoners effectively are deprived
of their constitutional rights, such a competitive edge would be ille-
gitimate.16 Similarly, if global currency is generated by economic
decisions with short-term gain, but foreseeable, long-term costs,
and information about these trade-offs was not given in a useful
way to the affected public, legitimacy problems may arise. 17 Child
labor,' poor wages,' 9 and unsafe working conditions 20 also are ar-
guably illegitimate forms of global currency. They all provide a
15. REICH, supra note 9.
16. E.g., Fox Butterfield, Hard Times, A Special Report: Profits at a Juvenile Prison
Come With a Chilling Cost, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1998, at Al.
[I]nmates of the privately run prison regularly appear at the infirmary with
black eyes, broken noses or jaws or perforated eardrums from beatings by
the poorly paid, poorly trained guards or from fights with other boys. Meals
are so meager that many boys lose weight. Clothing is so scarce that boys
fight over shirts and shoes. Almost all the teachers are uncertified, instruc-
tion amounts to as little as an hour a day, and until recently there were no
books . . . . From the beginning, the company . . . pursued a strategy of
maximizing profit from the fixed amount it received from the state for each
inmate .... The plan was to keep wages and services at a minimum while
taking in as many inmates as possible ....
Id.
17. For example, the deregulation of electricity rates at the generation level has
turned out to be more complex than first imagined. E.g., Nancy Vogel, How State's
Consumers Lost With Electricity Deregulation, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2000, at Al. It is,
therefore, important that there be public input into both the creation and continua-
tion of these markets. Id. The tradeoffs involved are, essentially, public questions that
require public input. E.g., id.; Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and In-
ternational Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039 (1993) (toxic dumping); Bill Maurer,
Cyberspatial Sovereignties: Offshore Finance, Digital Cash, and the Limits of Liber-
alism, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 493 (1998) (money laundering); Geoffrey W.
Smith, Competition in the European Financial Services Industry: The Free Movement
of Capital Versus the Regulation of Money Laundering, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 101,
124 (1992) (noting that the banking laws of countries such as Switzerland, Austria,
Monaco, Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, Uruguay, Gibraltar, and the Bahamas tend
to provide secrecy and tax havens that attract money launderers as well as legitimate
business).
18. See generally Katherine Cox, The Inevitability of Nimble Fingers? Law, Devel-
opment, and Child Labor, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 115, 128-29 (1999).
19. See generally JEAN DREZ8 & AMARTYA SEN, INDIA ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT AND SOCIAL OPPORTUNITY 13-16 (1995).
20. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL (1988).
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competitive advantage to a particular location and individuals asso-
ciated with it, but at a cost borne by people unable to choose fully
for themselves or unaware of the true costs of the "bargain" being
struck. For example, the costs of a toxic dump may not be fully
apparent to those likely to bear them, or those individuals may
have little or no effective power to resist them.2 '
Conceptualizing globalization primarily in economic, competi-
tive terms can easily reinforce domestic political discourses that
favor markets over government intervention, individualism over
more communitarian approaches to issues, and an increasing skep-
ticism (often unhealthy) of government in general.22 It encourages
the management of development through global currency. But the
move to privatization can be disentangled from political rhetoric
and ideological goals and beliefs. To explain more fully how the
public/private distinction can be applied in new and more demo-
cratic ways, I shall differentiate among various kinds of markets
and the politics that might best accompany them.
B. Differentiating and Matching Markets and Politics
Governments, at every level, can be viewed as territorially
bounded, economic units attempting to maximize their resources
and compete effectively with other economic units, whether they
be the state, municipality, or county next door, or jurisdictions lo-
cated halfway around the world.23 It does not always follow that
the scale of governmentally run services is efficient. At times, it
21. See Pam Belluck, As More Prisons Go Private, States Seek Tighter Controls,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1999, at Al (describing the private prison industry's recent prac-
tice of building "speculative prisons" in economically depressed areas).
[A] company arranges to build a prison and promises to fill it with inmates,
instead of contracting in advance with the state for a prison that state offi-
cials have decided they want .... [T]he company usually negotiates directly
with a town or city, often one desperate for jobs and corporate taxpayers
because its factories or mines have dried up .... There is often no contract
outlining the prison's responsibilities to that city or its state; the prison's only
contract is with the supplier of the inmates.
Id. The prison company buys land cheaply (in some cases, it is free) in exchange for
providing jobs, but local officials are given no control over prison conditions. Id. "It's
sort of like hazardous waste. . . . When you bring in something that is potentially
dangerous, which inmates are, what, if any, obligations do states have to regulate
them?" Id.
22. So much of the deregulation debates, particularly in the 1980s, were unfolded
with less analytical market discussion and with more political rhetoric aimed at the
"end of big government." AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra
note 5, at 44-45 & n.1. For a discussion of the shift from New Deal conceptions of
regulation to more market oriented approaches, see id. at 42, 53-55, 63-65.
23. HELD ET AL., supra note 5, at 45-52.
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may be more efficient to provide certain services 24 if the unit of
service is larger or it may be more efficient to combine forces with
another economic unit and eliminate duplication. 25 Given the ter-
ritorial constraints of governmental units, private actors often are
in a better position to conceptualize problems and implement solu-
tions that are not limited by arbitrary territorial boundaries. This is
one reason why, in theory at least, contracting out certain services
to private entities can yield efficiencies beyond what even an effi-
cient governmental unit might provide. Of course, the efficiencies
that come with the discipline of market competition are most likely
to occur in private enterprises that have profit maximization as
their primary goal. In many instances, the efficiency goals of the
private sector are in accord with those of the public, but as we shall
see below, the market discourse alone may not be broad enough to
encompass all relevant public values.
These efficiencies are even greater if a private unit capable of
operating in many jurisdictions at once can count on minimal or at
least the same kinds of regulation and regulatory costs throughout
the service area. Thus, pressures for regulatory harmonization are
likely to increase as services are provided by actors, parts of whose
efficiencies derive from being able to operate simultaneously in
multiple jurisdictions. One of the easiest ways to harmonize is to
privatize. Markets can provide a kind of uniformity. The mere
shift from public to private can, in effect, lessen certain kinds of
regulatory burdens that automatically apply to public entities, but
not necessarily to private entities. In short, another reason to
privatize is to realize the kind of "natural" harmonization that
results.
Finally, and even more important, low tax political approaches at
all levels of government may help attract or retain some businesses,
24. This includes "regulatory services" as well. For example, within the United
States, there often are economies of scale to be achieved between state clean air acts
and clean water acts. Pollutants do not follow boundaries, making interstate air com-
pacts (ozone) and watershed management necessary. See, e.g., Charles E. McChesney
II, The Interstate Ozone Pollution Negotiations: OTAG, EPA, and a Novel Approach
to Negotiated Rulemaking, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 615 (1999).
25. For example, rather than two contiguous counties both buying snow removal
equipment and clearing only their respective county roads, it may be more efficient
for the counties to divide the workload between the two snow removal crews. E.g.,
Todd Wildermuth, Counties Consider Swapping Some Snow Removal Road Duties,
TRINIDAD PLUS & THE RATON RANCE (Mar. 24, 1998) ("Certain roads in one county
are more easily accessible from the neighboring county, making it convenient and
time-effective for the neighboring county's crews to handle snow removal on those
portions of road."), available at http://www.trinidadco.com/stories98/news/-03/24/
road.html.
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but they obviously yield few resources and almost force govern-
mental units to seek new efficiencies through the reallocation of
their resources and re-engineering of the services they already pro-
vide. These kinds of financial changes usually pose difficult, politi-
cal challenges, but markets can allocate scarce resources in ways
that can seem to be neutral. Cuts are made and efficiencies created
because the market demands them, not because a particular indi-
vidual, who must at some point run for reelection, has mandated
them. The fundamental political decision is to opt for the market
in the first place-in other words, to choose to privatize. But once
this has been done, the winners and losers that result can be seen
as the impersonal outcomes of neutral market processes. The im-
personal qualities of the market, however, easily can lead to the
creation of illegitimate global currencies. These kinds of outcomes
often are hidden. If there is a lack of information available to the
public about the effects of market processes and how they are be-
ing implemented, those effects may be generally unknown for
some time.26 Challenging the actions of a private as opposed to a
public provider of services can be difficult, if a simplistic approach
to the public/private approach is taken.27 But even if constitutional
protections are available, federal or state freedom of information
26. For example, the public is slow to realize the effects of excessive concentration
that often result from deregulation without antitrust enforcement. See, e.g., John Bur-
rit McArthur, Antitrust in the New Deregulated Natural Gas Industry, 18 ENERGY L.J.
1, 87 (1997) (describing the effects of deregulation in the natural gas industry, a
widely touted example of successful deregulation). McArthur further argues that even
antitrust enforcement is difficult when the public lacks access to information:
A big problem facing those trying to understand the economic effects of
deregulation is that information is scarce. The formerly regulated are less
than eager to disclose their costs, prices, profits, and terms of service. Natu-
ral gas is no exception to the paucity of data. Many pipelines ... keep their
market positions and pricing secret ....
[M]any market abuses involve costs and profits or the pattern of prices. As
long as pipelines were regulated, they had to make this information public.
Pipelines filed detailed cost, revenue, and contract information annually ....
Whenever they wanted a higher rate, their pricing got a full hearing.
Once free of these requirements, pipelines have every incentive to hide
information. Customers are unlikely to have any way to uncover a pipeline's
cost structure or pricing pattern short of litigation that will cost hundreds of
thousands of dollars.
Id. at 33, 86-87.
27. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that the
decision of a state regulated public utility to discontinue service does not constitute
state action); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (finding that a private
organization's official position against homosexuality was protected by the First
Amendment as "expressive association").
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acts often are unlikely to apply and the kind of information neces-
sary to empower public interest groups may be lacking.28
In short, economic logics similar to those that apply at the inter-
national level apply at all levels of government. The multiplicity of
jurisdictions; the inherent limitations of territorially bounded gov-
ernmental entities; the relative freedom, flexibility, and efficiency
of private actors; and the need to conserve funds and create global
currencies with which to compete in a global economy all militate
in favor of privatization. Markets bring discipline and anonymity.
They bring uniformity too, as well as a means of making difficult
political decisions in relatively impersonal ways. Markets are per-
ceived as neutral, perhaps because of their complexity and imper-
sonal nature. Some markets and some market approaches might
improve public services, but are all markets the same? When is the
market primarily a regulatory scheme designed to achieve certain
public policy results and when is it a manifestation of individual
freedom, the outcome of which is, by definition, correct? When is
only the rhetoric of the market, rather than the discipline it is sup-
posed to provide, all that is involved? These are the questions to
which I now turn.
C. Markets and Metaphors
Economic discourses are seldom broad enough to encompass
fully issues involving human values such as the aesthetics of the
environment, the moral justifications for welfare, and a host of
other social justice and human rights issues.29 It is not that you
cannot do the economics of welfare or prisoners' rights, but, like
translating a poem from one language to another, it is the poetry
itself that is lost in translation." Rights that are subject to market
28. For a discussion of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994), and
privacy concerns in general that arise when private actors undertake public responsi-
bilities, see Alfred C. Aman Jr., Information, Privacy, and Technology: Citizens, Cli-
ents, or Consumers?, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
325 (Jack Beatson & Yvonne Cripps eds., 2000).
29. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SE-
CURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 29 (1983). Mashaw defines a moral judgment model that
allows for moral justifications in the exclusion of certain individuals from the
workforce. See generally MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH 7 (1988)
("There are important shared values, for example, health, well-being, safety, cleanli-
ness, and respect and reverence for nature, however, that unlike the goal of efficiency,
justify governmental intervention in markets, whether or not these markets are effi-
cient. These values ... provide a sound basis for social regulation.").
30. See generally Wayne Sandholtz, Globalization and the Evolution of Rules, in
GLOBALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE 77, 78-80 (Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey A. Hart
eds., 1999) (discussing the limitations of economic analysis).
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forces are no longer rights. But quite apart from the inability of a
purely economic discourse to encompass all of the values at stake,
issues of politics and ideology tend to merge the economic means
of achieving certain goals with economic ends in themselves.
When the tools of economics are used primarily as a means to an
end, there is no reason why those ends cannot be conceived of and
articulated in non-economic terms. In other words, our goal may
be affordable housing for all, and that goal can be achieved in effi-
cient ways. In theory, at least, the values underlying the goals in-
volved can be quite separate from the economics of their
accomplishment.3"
Nevertheless, there are limits to what markets can achieve and
accordingly there are limits to the use of markets as a means to an
end. Political discourse often blurs ends and means, especially in
the context of the market. Similar to the ways in which the uses of
technology can affect goals and outcomes, the efficiency of the
market and the individualistic philosophy that underlies it also can
color the substantive ends as well.32
Finally, closely related to the ends-means confusion that can re-
sult, many problems that are translated into market terms, in fact,
use references to the market more as a metaphor than as an analy-
sis of the relations between willing buyers and willing sellers, the
primary focus of a neo-classical economic model. A market ap-
proach may make sense from the point of view of the one who is to
provide certain management services, such as prisons, and at what
scale they are most efficiently provided, but the discourse of the
market hardly carries through to all of the affected parties in ways
that are similar to buying and selling natural gas or oil at the well-
head. Are the prisoners really consumers of the product? Are the
citizens of the jurisdiction in which prisons are located really just
customers? 33 How does the analysis of the market change when
we ask what role citizens have to play? The markets we are talking
about become more metaphorical than real when one looks at the
relationships among the groups involved in privatized services.34
The fundamental workings of markets do not always match com-
pletely the public interest goals that are sought. Just as traditional
31. See generally Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation
of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338 (1997).
32. See, e.g., ANDREW FEENBERG, CRITICAL THEORY OF TECHNOLOGY 7-8 (1991)
(discussing the impact of technology when it is thought of only as a means to an end).
33. See SAGOFF, supra note 29, at 7.
34. See IAN HARDEN, THE CONTRACTING STATE 6-28 (1992). For a more detailed
analysis of the market and private prisons, see Aman, supra note 2, at 798-800, 831-37.
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governmental approaches to markets have their limits, so too do
market approaches to law.35 The more metaphorical the market,
the more directly regulatory it is likely to be. This does not mean
that we should look immediately through the private corporate veil
and simply declare the entity involved as public.36 The matter is
more complex than that because the issues involved are neither
wholly public nor wholly private, but something with aspects of
both regimes. The questions to be asked are not those that simply
seek to assign the label of public or private. Three questions, in
particular, are relevant to the privatization of public functions such
as prisons: (1) what are the political values that the use of the mar-
ket seeks to achieve? (2) what is the impact of the power exercised
by entities involved in these markets on the individuals involved,
be they customers, consumers, or citizens? and (3) what kinds of
procedures are best to ensure the kind of public participation and
transparency necessary for political legitimacy?
II. GLOBALIZATION AND THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION
Public/private partnerships and the use of private entities to
achieve public-oriented goals did not begin with, nor result from
globalization. The public and the private sectors long have been in
dialogue.37 The United States Constitution highlights the distinc-
tion between private and state action.38 Though the state action
doctrine is less than clear, in many instances, the insistence on a
division between the public and private sectors remains an impor-
35. See generally Mark Kelman, On Democracy Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the
Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV.
199 (1988); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 167-71 (1987);
Mark Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984).
36. Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative
Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 847 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman, Private Parties] (not-
ing that "the task is more complicated than merely delineating a threshold test to
determine when a private actor is performing a 'sufficiently public' function to justify
the imposition of public law constraints" and raising a number of new questions that
need examination); see also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000).
37. See Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth Cen-
tury Culture of Contracting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52
ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 863 (2000); see also Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance
and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1611
(2001) (noting how long many of these market-oriented tools have been in existence).
38. See generally Jack M. Beermann, The Reach of Administrative Law in the
United States, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 171 (Michael Taggart ed.,
1997).
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tant part of constitutional jurisprudence.39 There has, therefore, al-
ways been the need to differentiate the public from the private for
some issues,40 and this distinction continues to be relevant, even
though globalization means that the state functions in new ways.
Transnational processes necessitate new approaches for determin-
ing where the public/private line might be and whether we should
draw such a line in the first place. Some of the modern partner-
ships that carry out mixed market and public goals result in entities
that are neither wholly public nor wholly private. They are power-
ful, though, and they do affect people's lives, sometimes dramati-
cally. But how to describe them, much less govern them, should
turn on a discourse that is more complex and flexible than the sim-
plistic labeling exercises that traditional public/private analyses
often encourage. Richardson v. McKnight4" is a case in point.
A. The PubliclPrivate Distinction and Private Prisons:
Richardson v. McKnight
Richardson v. McKnight42 arose from a suit filed by a prisoner in
a private prison claiming damages for injuries incurred when his
handcuffs were put on too tightly by prison guards. McKnight
brought suit under 42 U.S.C § 1983 even though the prison in
which he was incarcerated was private.43 The fundamental ques-
tion in this case was whether private contract law should apply,
thereby depriving the guards of an governmental immunity de-
fense, or whether, given the fact that a private prison is engaged in
what is clearly a public function, the guards should be treated the
same as they would in a public prison. This was, in essence, the
primary issue for Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion.4 He
sought to draw a very bright line between the public and private,
label the activities involved as one or the other, and then act ac-
cordingly. Justice Scalia maintained that this prison was public for
purposes of this lawsuit because no "real market" was at work:
[I]t is fanciful to speak of the consequences of "market" pres-
sures in a regime where public officials are the only purchaser,
39. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288,
121 S. Ct. 924, 939 (2001) ("If the Fourteenth Amendment is not to be displaced,
therefore, its ambit cannot be a simple line between States and people operating
outside formally governmental organizations.").
40. Aman, supra note 28, at 333-36.
41. 521 U.S. 399 (1996).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 401.
44. Id. at 414.
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and other people's money the medium of payment. Ultimately,
one prison-management firm will be selected to replace another
prison-management firm only if a decision is made by some po-
litical official not to renew the contract .... This is a govern-
ment decision, not a market choice.4 5
In short, for Justice Scalia, the private prison was carrying out a
public function. Private prison guards were no different than the
prison guards in public institutions. Immunity should, therefore,
be granted to them, just as it would have been granted in a public
setting.
The majority, writing through Justice Breyer, disagreed. First,
Justice Breyer differentiated the private from the public by empha-
sizing the regulatory regime within which the guards were working:
[G]overnment employees typically act within a different system.
They work within a system that is responsible through elected
officials to voters who, when they vote, rarely consider the per-
formance of individual subdepartments or civil servants specifi-
cally and in detail. And that system is often characterized by
multidepartment civil service rules that, while providing em-
ployee security, may limit the incentives or the ability of individ-
ual departments or supervisors flexibility to reward, or to
punish, individual employees.46
Having done this, however, the majority then examined the reg-
ulatory aspects of the market, noting that a suit of this type was an
important incentive, given the private nature of the prison, its pris-
oners, and its employees. Indeed, given that the private prison
guards operated "within a different system," they needed different
incentives to carry out their duties appropriately. Moreover, the
concerns that troubled the dissent-that guards would be deterred
from doing their duty47 -easily were handled in this private setting
by insurance, not official immunity. 48
For the majority, the market in this case may not have been
"real" in the microeconomic sense demanded by Justice Scalia, but
it was a coherent system, with a logic of its own and a set of incen-
tives and disincentives that encouraged certain kinds of behavior
and discouraged others. This was, in fact, a regulatory market and
in this context, McKnight's lawsuit was important because such po-
tential liability on the part of the guards would discourage activity
45. Id. at 418-19.
46. Id. at 410-11.
47. Id. at 411.
48. Id. at 420.
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that could undermine the private prisoners' constitutional rights.
The suit was also a means of ensuring public input into this priva-
tized system. It was a way of holding the guards accountable. Hav-
ing said this, though, the kind of market-regulatory regime that this
private prison represented cannot be analyzed with only private-
market logic. Justice Scalia was correct in concluding this was not a
"real" market, but it did not necessarily follow that the "public"
label applied. The fundamental purpose of this hybrid regulatory
regime was to use market incentives to carry out public responsibil-
ities. The result was, in a sense, neither public nor private. It had
within it elements of both.
Refusing to treat the public/private distinction as an either/or
discourse forces an analysis based more closely on the nature of the
power being exercised, the relative strength or bargaining power of
those most directly affected by this power,49 and a thorough exami-
nation of the nature of the market sought to be created, its pur-
poses, and likely effects. Bright lines between markets and
regulation or public and private are, therefore, neither necessary
nor desirable. There can be many kinds of markets and their regu-
latory nature requires they be transparent and thus accountable.
B. Multiple Markets and Multiple Forms of Democracy
The classic microeconomic market model posits willing buyers
and willing sellers in situations where there is competition for the
goods involved and the price ultimately paid is equal to the margi-
nal cost of producing the last unit of that good.50 Microeconomic
theory thus provides an important rationale for deregulating the
price of oil or gas at the wellhead, as well as the generation of elec-
trical power. These are all resources for which markets exist and
scarcity can be allocated in accordance with prices set by market
forces.5 Similarly, a decision to deregulate airlines or telecommu-
nications also is premised on the fact that markets can exist in
49. See generally Paul Craig, Public Law and Control over Public Power, in THE
PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 196 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997).
50. See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS
(14th ed. 1992).
51. For discussions of the deregulation of these markets, see Richard J. Pierce, A
Proposal to Deregulate the Market for Bulk Power, 72 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1986) (ad-
dressing electricity); STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MAcAvoY, ENERGY REGULA-
TION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION (1974) (addressing natural gas); Alfred
C. Aman Jr., Institutionalizing the Energy Crisis: Some Structural and Procedural Les-
sons, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 493 (1980) (addressing oil).
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these industries.5 2 A decision to delegate the management of pris-
ons to the private sector, however, is a different use of the market.
It is not intended to substitute the market for regulation, but rather
to use the market as a means of providing the same services as
those provided by the state. This, however, does not necessarily
mean that it will be relatively easy to make a state action argument
and conclude that these entities are, by and large, public for certain
constitutional purposes.53 The procedural implications of this form
of governance are more complex than the question of whether the
constitution applies or not. Due Process procedural protections,
particularly as applied to prisons, welfare, and social services, gen-
erally have declined considerably. 4 Moreover, the issues involved
with municipal services are broader than the individual rights per-
spective that the constitution often can encompass. The types of
markets created by contracting out municipal services, the manage-
ment of prisons, or the eligibility of welfare recipients can be dif-
ferentiated. At least three different kinds of markets can be
discerned-each, I will argue, made transparent in a way appropri-
ate for the primary societal role it is intended to play.
52. For a discussion of some of the complexities of the deregulation of airline and
television broadcasting industries, see Aman, supra note 4, at 270-88.
53. Courts generally find state action where: (1) a deprivation is "caused by the
exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct im-
posed by the state or by a persQn for whom the State is responsible," and (2)
the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to
be a state actor. This may because he is a state official, because he has acted
together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because
his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). The inquiry is fact-specific and
must be conducted on a case-by-case basis. Patricia M. Wald, Looking Forward to the
Next Millennium: Social Previews to Legal Change, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1085, 1104 n.116
(1997).
54. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (holding that Due Process was not
violated when a prisoner was not allowed to present witnesses in a disciplinary hear-
ing); Colson ex rel. Colson v. Sillman, 35 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that state
welfare benefits are not an "entitlement" and do not trigger procedural due process).
For an excellent analysis of the changing role of procedure in welfare cases, see Mat-
thew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and En-
trepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121 (2000). For an overview of the
decline of procedural due process generally, and especially in prisons and welfare, see
Richard J. Pierce Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L.
REv. 1973 (1996).
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1. The Classical Market-Consumer and
Shareholder Democracy
The classic theoretical market is one in which competition is per-
fect and transaction costs are minimal. When Alfred Kahn, then
Chair of the Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB"), advocated deregu-
lation of airline pricing and routes, he described the airplane as
"marginal cost with wings. '55 In theory, at least, the airline indus-
try was one in which competition was possible and prices could be
set by the market mechanism. Though it was not as easy as many
thought to move from a history of regulation to a truly free mar-
ket,56 such forms of deregulation rely on the proper assignment of
private property rights and the antitrust laws to assure the competi-
tion necessary to keep prices fair.
Abolishing the CAB and opting for a market approach to airline
pricing eliminated direct public participation of the kind for which
the regulatory process provided-rulemaking and adjudication
under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 58 Yet one rea-
sonably could argue that the democracy of the market could and,
indeed, should replace the form of regulatory democracy provided
by the APA. This is because the ability of consumers to "vote with
their feet" would achieve the basic goals that the CAB sought to
foster: fair, competitive prices and good availability of flights on
various routes.5 9 The pricing mechanism and consumer reaction to
airline prices and routes provided the discipline needed, in theory,
to achieve the optimal service in the industry. The fact that this
turned out to be far more difficult than originally thought is be-
yond the scope of this discussion.6" For our purposes, however, it is
55. Elizabeth Bailey & Dong Liu, Airline Consolidation and Consumer Welfare,
21 E. ECON. J. 463 (1995).
While it was recognized that regional carriers had a higher cost structure
than national carriers, it was thought that this would be eliminated by per-
mitting free entry and exit. As Alfred Kahn once expressed it, airplanes are
"marginal costs with wings" that can readily be deployed in newly opened
markets.
Id.
56. Alfred Kahn, Airline Deregulation-A Mixed Bag, But a Clear Success Never-
theless, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 229, 236 (1989); see also Aman, supra note 4, at 273 (noting
especially that "deregulation without antitrust enforcement is an ineffective policy").
57. Aman, supra note 4, at 273. See generally Kahn, supra note 56, at 236-37.
58. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994).
59. See generally MARTHA DETHRICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DER-
EGULATION 36-37 (1985).
60. Aman, supra note 4, at 272-73. Of course, as will be discussed more fully be-
low, even when a market is established, the better the information that consumers
have, the more competitive and effective the market can be.
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clear that a market was possible and that market was intended to
replace fully the regulatory regime then in place.
Closely related to the kind of market democracy that was sought
by deregulation in this case is shareholder democracy. 61 The indi-
vidual competitive companies involved are run to please their
shareholders. They, too, can vote and have a say not only over
who runs the companies involved, but how. Usually, however, the
purposes of such organizations rarely stray from profit maximiza-
tion, but there can be, for example, ethical limits in how these prof-
its are generated and shareholder meetings can be a forum for a
variety of views on such questions.62 The essence of market de-
mocracy is this: competitive companies participating in competitive
markets are held accountable by their shareholders and the con-
sumers they seek to serve. Transparency is achieved when prices
are competitive, known to the consumer, and the services offered
are freely chosen. The purposes of the participation made possible
through shareholder meetings are primarily to ensure that the com-
pany is being run efficiently and that profits are maximized.
2. Regulatory Markets-Administrative and Judicial Democracy
Another approach to markets is to use the incentives they create
as a regulatory tool. Rather than relying on so-called command
and control regulations governing pollution, the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") some time ago initiated a variety of
market approaches to various pollution issues. These include, for
example, selling pollution permits and allowing companies to ex-
change them.63 Such attempts seek to use the discipline of market
incentives to encourage certain behavior and to do so in as efficient
a way as possible.64 Market approaches give individual regulated
entities more opportunity to choose for themselves how best to
achieve certain regulatory goals. The end result is usually lower
regulatory costs and an expectation of more effective regulation.
This often is achieved because enforcement is more difficult and
61. See generally Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Environmental
Law and Business in the 21st Century: Environmental Activism and the Ethical Inves-
tor, 22 IOWA J. CORP. L. 465 (1997).
62. Id.
63. E.g., Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407-7671 (1994 & Supp. IV
1993).
64. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:
The Democratic Case fbr Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988) ("[A]
reformed regulatory system will, over time, promote a public dialogue that will enable
a ... resolution of the choices Americans face in shaping the future of environmental
law.").
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less likely to occur. The market approach to the environment has
been in effect in various areas of the law for some time. We are
now at a point where careful, empirical work is possible to deter-
mine how well these regulatory markets have delivered.65
The participation and transparency associated with these regula-
tory approaches are provided by traditional administrative
processes and judicial review. Rulemaking, adjudication, and con-
tractual individualized approaches to environmental issues all pro-
vide visibility and opportunities for the public to participate in
these processes. The Clinton Administration's reinvention of gov-
ernment programs utilized these approaches in a wide variety of
environmental and other regulatory arenas.66
3. Privatized Services and Contractual Democracy
Quite apart from the relatively competitive markets that are, at
least theoretically, possible with airlines (or natural gas pricing at
the wellhead), and the regulatory uses of the market by govern-
ment agencies described above, privatization of or contracting out
of governmental services presents a different use of the market
with different approaches to and a different rationale for public
input and participation. As a member of society, each of us has
multiple identities that come into play in the variety of social con-
texts we encounter every day. We exercise our right and duty as
citizens when we vote. We purchase goods of all kinds as consum-
ers and, collectively, we may be the customers, or, in effect, the
third-party beneficiaries, of a variety of contracts entered into by
our elected (or appointed) representatives to provide services for
the public good. In many ways, privatizing traditional governmen-
tal services merges the roles and aspects of individuals' multiple
"identities" as consumers, citizens, and customers. Purely competi-
tive markets deal primarily with consumers; regulatory markets are
created by government agencies on behalf of citizens. However,
privatized services emphasize the role of citizens as the benefi-
ciaries of the services provided. But these customers may, in some
instances, be consumers too, as in the case of snow removal or gar-
65. One area of environmental regulatory markets that has empirical data is the
trading of sulphur dioxide allowances under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.
For a discussion of the results of trading programs and a comparison with traditional
instruments, see Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Con-
trol Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative
Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 887, 932 (1999).
66. See Alfred C. Aman Jr., A Global Perspective On Current Regulatory Reform:
Rejection, Relocation, or Reinvention?, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (1995).
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bage collection. Given the public aspects of the functions per-
formed by private actors, they are citizens as well. Too often,
however, the politics of privatization and the market populism
67
that is often a dominant part of the political rhetoric that comes
into play make it seem as if the privatization of prisons or the de-
termination of welfare eligibility were similar to the deregulation
of airlines or cable television. 68 The transparency that comes with
consumers or customers voting with their feet, as it were, is not
likely to materialize in the context of such privatized governmental
services without processes designed to provide the kind of informa-
tion that can empower citizens and make their participation mean-
ingful. Quite apart from the rhetoric of markets, however, many of
the functions being performed by private actors should not be be-
yond traditional public law statutes such as the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act; nor should transparency be assumed simply because a
market discourse is employed.
As I argued in Part I, the reasons for privatization need not be
ideological nor anti-government in spirit. The ability of private
providers to conceptualize problems in terms that transcend geo-
graphical boundary lines can, under some circumstances, provide a
cost-effective edge to municipalities, states, or the federal govern-
ment in carrying out their respective responsibilities for providing
various services. Moreover, it may be that in some circumstances
such private providers are not just the agents of government, but
agents of positive change as well. The innovative aspects of some
markets can be beneficial to us all. It does not follow, however,
that privatization means private in the traditional way we usually
use the term, namely to designate the line between purely volun-
tary market actions and those collectively and publicly concerned
and executed.
Like the complexities of the public/private distinction that such
"reforms" invoke, the complex market and market-like relation-
ships created by privatization of governmental services highlight
the multiple identities of the various groups of individuals in-
volved-the decision-makers, the beneficiaries of the services, and
the consumers of those services. Just as there are many complexi-
ties involved in trying to understand the capacity in which the vari-
ous individuals affected by decisions to privatize governmental
67. For a lively analysis of how markets and market rhetorics have been overex-
tended to a variety of contexts that make the use metaphorical at best, see THOMAS
FRANK, ONE MARKET UNDER GOD 51-87 (2000).
68. Id.
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services are acting-consumers, customers, citizens-there is also a
need to recognize that various forms of citizen participation also
may be available as well. Some situations may call only for con-
sumer or marketplace democracy, but others will demand more
complex mixtures of citizen/consumer/customer perspectives and
levels of transparency that transcend the information coded solely
in the form of market prices.
For example, the decision to contract out prison services to the
private sector is a political one and should engage all citizens in the
relevant jurisdiction. Once a political determination is made, how-
ever, do we really relegate citizens solely to the role of customers?
Can the administration of this kind of public responsibility be sepa-
rated so completely from policy and politics? What of the consum-
ers of this service on a daily basis? If they are the prisoners, do
they have any rights at all, since their consumption is, to say the
least, involuntary?6 9 If so, democratic input may be appropriate
only when the contract is up for renewal and judgments can be
made as to the success or failure of the enterprise at that time.
What was the extent of participation at the contract stage and is
there a mechanism for producing the kind of information necessary
to ensure appropriate public monitoring of the responsibilities car-
ried out under the contract? These are the kinds of questions that
69. Private prisons are treated as "state actors" for purposes of civil rights suits.
Street v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 1996); Payne v. Monroe
County, 779 F. Supp. 1330 (S.D. Fla. 1991); DOUGLAS McDONALD ET AL., PRIVATE
PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES 59 (1988) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)).
In West, the Supreme Court held that a physician who is under contract with the state
to provide medical services to inmates at a state prison hospital on a part-time basis
acts "under color of state law," within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), when
he treats an inmate. West, 487 U.S. at 57. In the context of private prisons, the court in
Payne, reiterated the basic principle that:
A section 1983 action can be maintained when it can be established that the
defendant acted under color of state law or exercises power possessed by
virtue of state law. In West, the court found the requisite state action where
a private physician was employed by the state to perform a duty of the state.
Where a function which is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state
is performed by a private entity, state action is also present.
Payne, 779 F. Supp. at 1385 (internal citations omitted).
It also is clear that a state cannot absolve itself of responsibility for its prisoners
simply by contracting its duties over to a private entity. For example, in Scott v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, Civil Action 98-01645, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21616 (D.D.C. 1999),
the court found that, just as "'contracting out medical care does not relieve the State
of its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those in its cus-
tody ... the [state] may not avoid its Eighth Amendment obligations to its prisoners
by delegation to an independent contractor.'" Id. at *15-16 (internal citation omitted).
For a discussion of common law remedies, see Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399
(1996).
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can help structure both our conception of the process involved and
the kinds of processes we believe necessary for it to work.The new
administrative law is and should be about determining how best to
conceptualize public/private relationships not only to assure fair-
ness for those affected by these decisions, but information that will
enable us to assess how best to determine whether these new ar-
rangements are working and are workable from a democratic point
of view.
Such issues are and should be at the heart of administrative law
reform today. They transcend the privatization of governmental
services and embrace similar issues involving the significance and
the impact of global information technologies that are also private,
but should not be unaccountable because they are private.7 0 Ad-
ministrative democracy needs to be imagined anew, not from the
either/or vantage point of public or private, but from an under-
standing of the complex, multiple roles markets now play in our
overall governance structure and the multiple identities that we as
individuals express in our various societal interactions. I turn now
to some principles that should guide our evaluation of proposals
for reform.
C. Making Markets More Transparent: Expanding
Administrative Democracy
Three avenues of reform are important to pursue if we not only
are to enhance administrative democracy by making markets ac-
countable, but if we are to do so without simply recreating a purely
public model and imposing it on the hybrid markets that now have
emerged. It is important to transcend the either/or thinking em-
bedded in U.S. public law by recognizing that the state action doc-
trine and procedural due process are not the only touchstones we
have in determining when participation and transparency is re-
quired. Another set of questions involves the power relationships
between and among those providing and those receiving services,
what those services are, and what function they provide in soci-
ety. 1 Second, though I shall talk in terms of the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"), it is with the intention of transforming it
70. I have addressed the public/private distinction in this context in Aman, supra
note 28.
71. The approach taken to natural justice issues in Great Britain and elsewhere is
instructive. See, e.g., Regina v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin, Plc
1987 Q.B. 815, 846-49 (Eng. C.A.) (rejecting a formalistic approach to when proce-
dures apply in favor of' criterion which requires the court to consider the nature of the
power wielded by a particular entity-public or private).
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for public/private partnerships, not simply applying concepts de-
signed for another age to the present. The APA is, thus, an impor-
tant symbol of the statutory possibilities that might exist to
increase transparency and participation in hybrid governance struc-
tures. It is not a blueprint to be applied in a mechanical fashion.
Finally, placing these procedural issues in a global context not only
helps explain some of the driving economic forces involved, and
the interrelated nature of the changes taking place in other parts of
our economy and government, but this context suggests that we
can learn from some of the so-called softer law approaches that are
developing in the international law arena. Not unlike the kinds of
transparency provided in the context of treaty compliance, the
multi-district, blurred public/private aspects of domestic govern-
ance structures also require procedural approaches that may be
more informational, rather than obligatory, in nature. 72
1. Beyond State Action and Due Process
The constitutional limitations of the application of the Bill of
Rights are based, in part, on the state action doctrine. For exam-
ple, before courts will order agencies to grant hearings, pursuant to
the Due Process clauses, there must be a state actor involved. 73
For due process purposes, either an individual property or a liberty
interest also must be involved to trigger the protections of the Con-
stitution. As noted above, however, courts have cut back signifi-
cantly on the application of due process generally and to prisoners
in public institutions." There has been a constitutional deregu-
latory trend occurring in the courts that, in many ways, parallels
the shift from states to markets in various regulatory contexts.7 5 If
one simply were to opt for treating private prison inmates just like
those in public prisons for purposes of due process, constitutional
72. See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY 135-73 (1995). For a discussion of the topic of informational regulation,
see Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of Environmental
Risks, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 155, 156-57 (1998). But see Freeman, Private Parties, supra
note 36, at 853 (noting that "informational regulation not subject to adequate over-
sight would likely pose accountability problems itself because of the potential for in-
dustry manipulation of the information disclosure process.").
73. Ronald J. Krotoszynsky Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of
Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH L. REV. 302
(1995).
74. Supra note 54 and accompanying text.
75. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), with Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Colson ex rel.
Sillman, 35 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1994).
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procedural protections would be minimal. To label certain services
as public will not necessarily bring much, if any constitutional pro-
cedural rights to the individual litigants involved. The Due Process
Clause remedies developed pursuant to Goldberg v. Kelly76 and
other "new property" cases no longer apply in ways that effectively
provide the kinds of rights and remedies as in the past.77
Similarly, the state action doctrine has been and continues to be
remarkably resistant to any clear statement of principle.78 Never-
theless, given the complex nature of the hybrid markets that priva-
tized governmental services create, it should not be hard to find
some connections to state action. The focus of such an enterprise,
however, is beside the point. Where powerful institutions control
important aspects of individuals' lives, there should be a legal com-
mitment to a level of process necessary to assure transparency in
the decision-making process regardless of the label we place on the
entities involved.79
To accomplish the basic goals set forth in a non-state focused
approach to procedure, it is necessary to privatize the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, not by eliminating procedures for public ac-
tors, but by devising and extending new procedural approaches to
non-governmental private entities exercising substantial power
with wide ranging societal effects. The state-centered notion of our
public law must be brought into alignment with the realities of the
de-centered state in the global economy of which we now are a
part. The challenge is to do this in a way that does not raise costs
unduly, but furthers the basic goals of fairness, transparency, and
participation. The public nature of the powers wielded by private
actors should not simply trigger the same public law remedies that
were devised for very different entities. Rather, more nuanced ap-
76. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
77. Diller, supra note 54, at 1191; Pierce, supra note 54.
78. Krotoszynsky, supra note 73, at 321-24. This, of course, has been procedural-
ized to the point where it is now almost counter-productive. The basic approach in
informal rulemaking is still a good model for the new administrative law developing.
See generally KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 6-7, at 161-251
(3d ed. Supp. 2000) (calling informal rulemaking "one of the greatest inventions of
modern government").
79. The court's approach in Regina v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte
Datafin, Plc 1987 Q.B. 815 (Eng. C.A.), is helpful. In that case, the English court
looked at the functions a particular entity was exercising to determine whether the
power being exercised was, in effect, public. Such an approach rejects institutional
analyses that focus on the public or private character of the entity involved in favor of
an approach that looks to the impact of the power a society and the individual liti-
gants. See Paul Craig, Public Law and Control over Private Power, in THE PROVINCE
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 196 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997).
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proaches are necessary, in which flexible procedures such as an
unadorned approach to informal rulemaking, or new, information-
based models of procedure are employed.
2. Privatizing the APA
To extend procedural requirements to the private or privatized
public sector is best accomplished through statutory reform, rather
than constitutional interpretation. The APA, like almost all of the
law governing bureaucratic discretion, is state or agency oriented.
The Freedom of Information Act80 and the Privacy Act,8 for ex-
ample, are limited in their application solely to "agencies. '82 Simi-
larly, the APA itself applied only to "agencies," defined as
authorities of the "Government of the United States. ' 83 The first
goal of privatized procedural reform is, thus, to extend coverage to
private actors engaged in public functions. There will be problems
of scope and definition to be worked out,8 4 but the guiding princi-
ples should be that processes that go beyond market democracy are
required when (1) the individuals affected are acting more in their
capacity as citizens than as consumers or customers, or (2) that the
individuals affected by the decisions involved are subject to a dis-
proportionate application of power, given the position they occupy
relative to the service provider.
In addition to broadening the statutory coverage of the APA to
include private actors, there are some specific provisions of that
Act that need to be expanded because of the greater role they play
today in important policy-making areas. As I have argued else-
where, the contracts provision of the APA was intended to play a
much different role than, in fact, it does today. There are, of
course, a variety of rules that apply to government contracts, in-
cluding bidding procedures, procurement, and conflict of interest
rules.8 6 These rules and procedures are designed primarily to en-
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
81. Id. § 552a.
82. For a discussion of these Acts, their state-centered focus, and a proposal to
extend them to the private sector, see Aman, supra note 28, at 325.
83. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).
84. For a discussion of a new freedom of information act in Great Britain and its
extension to the private sector, see Stephanie Palmer, Freedom of Information: The
New Proposals, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION (Jack
Beatson & Yvonne Cripps eds., 2000).
85. Aman, Proposals for Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act, supra note
5, at 412-19.
86. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 218 (1994) (implemented by Exec. Order No. 12,448, 48 Fed.
Reg. 51,281 (1983)) (concerning conflicts of interest); Federal Acquisition Streamlin-
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sure the integrity of the process up to and at the time the contract
is made. The procedural focus of public service contracts, however,
also should be on the day-to-day aspects of how such contracts are
administered. The public nature of the functions to which they ap-
ply requires ongoing transparency. To this end, public service con-
tracts should be seen as detailed rules, and the process, rather than
being exempt from rulemaking, should be subject to an unadorned
form of informal notice and comment proceedings. The contracts
should be published for comment on the policy-making aspects in-
herent in the duties to be undertaken.
Moreover, once a contract is set, just as a rule, there should be
opportunities to petition the governmental agency involved for its
amendment, even before the contract expires. It may be that it is
only with the application of the contract to the facilities that new
problems emerge. It is at that point that public input may be nec-
essary. Contracts should be seen as part of an evolving process of
governance, not the final culmination of private negotiations. In-
deed, this process will differ from traditional contracts that are fi-
nalized at the time of agreement. Negotiation, flexibility, feedback
and opportunities to amend and change one's approach to various
policy issues must remain open, if input is to matter. This does not
mean the basic framework of the agreement must change, but if
policy questions arise within that framework, the flexibility must
exist to react to them on the part of the private entities involved as
well as the opportunity to comment on them by the public. To this
end, issues of finality need to be reassessed since the fluidity of
governance differs from the kind of certainty that traditional con-
tracts between buyers and sellers usually imply.
Quite apart from the procedures for contracting suggested
above, there is a more fundamental aspect of the transparency in-
volved and this is information. Information empowers those who
have it and it is at the basis of any realistic politics of reform. A
reliable source of current information can reaffirm the decisions to
privatize in the first instance, or it can undermine those decisions,
indicating the weaknesses of market approaches to some issues. It
also can provide an opportunity to correct problems with the mar-
ket approaches that have developed so as to further societal goals
in a more effective way, without changing the market-oriented
ing Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243; Federal Acquisition Reform Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 642 (concerning procurement). The Federal
Acquisition Reform Act is now called the Clinger-Cohen Act. 40 U.S.C. § 1401
(Supp. III 1997).
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character of the regulatory approach involved. An information-
based approach resonates with procedural developments in inter-
national law, developments from which we can draw inspiration in
our approach to domestic reform.
3. Globalizing the APA
Placing domestic procedural reform in a global context high-
lights the global political-economic forces that now drive govern-
mental reform at all levels. This does not mean that there are not
some aspects of globalization that domestic legal regimes should
resist. Indeed, one important role for the domestic administrative
law of the future is to provide the procedural basis for mitigating, if
not correcting, some of the externalities of globalization.87 Indeed,
this transformative role of domestic law is premised on the assump-
tion that the economic aspects of global processes are not necessa-
rily inevitable, nor are they linear in nature.8" Rather, an
important role for domestic law, and in particular domestic admin-
istrative law, is to transform global forces in ways that enhance
rather than undercut democracy. In so doing, approaches to
globalization that rely extensively on laissez-faire market ap-
proaches at both the international and domestic levels of govern-
ance are overstated.89 At the same time, approaches to resistance
premised on the idea that global forces can be rejected if only there
is the political will to do so can be counterproductive and, in some
contexts, unrealistic as well.90 A more transformative approach to
globalization sees the impact of global forces as neither linear nor
inevitable, but capable of being shaped and influenced by local po-
litical desires and preferences. This kind of approach encourages
87. See Alfred C. Aman Jr., The Limits of Globalization and the Future of Admin-
istrative Law: From Government to Governance, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
(forthcoming 2001).
88. Id.; see HELD ET AL., supra note 5, at 2-10.
89. For a discussion of what David Held calls the "hyperglobalist approach" to
globalization, see HELD ET AL., supra note 5, at 3-5.
90. Protectionist trade legislation, as well as extremely stringent legislative ap-
proaches to immigration, may fall into this category. See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner,
The Fallacy of Social "Citizenship," or the Threat of Exclusion, 12 GEO. IMMIOR. L.J.
35, 50 (1997). Demleitner explains the negative fallout from many organizations and
local governments concerning the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 115, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), and its limitation of statutory benefits to
permanent resident aliens. One backlash was the consideration of granting local vot-
ing rights to permanent residents, signaling that "globalization does not imply merely
freedom of movement of capital, services, and goods, but also of people." Demleitner,
supra, at 58.
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new procedural models and a recognition that market-based pub-
lic/private partnerships may require "softer," informational proce-
dural approaches rather than traditional public law approaches or
the privacy of markets.
Procedures can help to provide citizens and policymakers impor-
tant information about important problems-be they the environ-
ment, public health, or issues involving the administration of
public-oriented contracts. Individual state agencies and represent-
atives can respond as they see fit, but information plays another
key role: it is the basic ingredient for informed political debate. I
believe that creating a global politics at the local level is one of the
foremost challenges of our time. This is not only because it is not
always easy to see connections between the global and the local.
Rather, market approaches can make the fact that choices are in-
volved more hidden than they, in fact, are. An information proce-
dural approach to the public/private sector could, at a minimum,
provide information to the public about the cost and cost-effective-
ness of market approaches to issues. It also could do so by com-
paring purely public sector approaches to the problems at hand as
well as comparing service approaches and results in other coun-
tries-both developed and developing. The perspectives created
by such an approach can play an important role by providing the
bases for evaluation of market approaches to public functions. In
this way, governance as opposed to mere consumerism can take
place. An information approach to procedure has, of course, his-
torically played an important role in U.S. domestic administrative
law, with various reporting requirements in a variety of contexts.91
91. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994) (establishing notification and report-
ing requirements relating to hazardous chemicals); 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. III
1997) (requiring agencies to publish public information in the Federal Register, and to
make nonpublished materials available to persons who request them); 2 U.S.C.
§§ 431-456 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (requiring candidates for federal office to disclose
certain types of campaign contributions); see also Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77h, j (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (establishing disclosure requirements for offerings of
securities); Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1994)
(requiring banks to maintain records of where they make mortgage loans and to make
such records available to the public); Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12
U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1994) (subjecting banks to detailed reporting requirements, and
rating the banks based on the extent to which they serve their community); Crime
Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990 § 204(a), 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)-(6)
(1994) (requiring that colleges develop policies to encourage the prompt reporting of
crimes to police and college officials); Higher Education Amendments of 1992
§ 486(c)(1)-(2), 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F), (f)(7) (1994) (requiring that colleges com-
pile and report statistics on listed crimes including sexual assault); Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1342, 1369 (1994) (requiring permit holders to
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Indeed, there have been a variety of attempts to deregulate certain
information requirements.92 Cost is a factor and "one size fits all"
reporting requirements may work. Nevertheless, the basic idea of
information, particularly as applied to the contracting function, is
critical if the public is to play a significant and ongoing role in mon-
itoring the public functions of private entities. Contracts, in this
sense, can be analogized to treaties and, as such, compliance is nec-
essary as are public opportunities for comment and suggested
amendments. A global context can lead not only to more cost-ef-
fective procedures, but can do so in a way that does not see the
shift from states to markets in purely ideological ways, but rather
as a means of creating a more interactive, interdependent world, in
which the values of public law are preserved in new ways.
CONCLUSION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON
LOCAL RESPONSIBILITIES
In this article I have argued that we must reform our domestic
legal procedures and approaches to issues in order to ensure demo-
cratic participation in decisions that have broad societal effects and
that involve public and private aspects. It is important to note that
this is a two-way street. Not only do global trends inspire local
reforms, but by so doing, local approaches can have an impact on
globalization processes as well. Global processes and the outcomes
they produce are not inevitable. Nor are they linear. The local
politics of administrative governance can help shape and transform
the law, locally and globally, in important ways.
Concepts of global citizenship93 and a global public interest 94 are
capable of flourishing at the local level, particularly if there is in-
formation about decision-making processes and their impact neces-
sary to create the politics for this to occur. Process at the local
public/private level can link local issues to global political move-
ments and networks, thereby helping to create a politics of reform,
even for issues long thought beyond either the interest or respect
of the majority of local voters involved. The death penalty and
some aspects of women's rights, such as the Violence Against Wo-
sample their discharges and then submit the results in the form of discharge-monitor-
ing reports ("DMRs") to the proper authority; these DMRs are made available to the
public).
92. See, e.g., Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1994).
93. See Symposium, The State of Citizenship, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447
(2000).
94. See generally Delbrfick, supra note 5; Aman, Proposals for Reforming the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, supra note 5.
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men Act 95 are examples of domestic issues that may be affected by
new perspectives from beyond our borders. The reasons to under-
stand local issues as part of a global framework not only make
clear that what is at stake is nothing less than public law values
such as transparency, fairness, and participation, but also the op-
portunity to shape, influence, and transform global forces in con-
structive ways. The reforms suggested here can help mitigate some
aspects of a democracy deficit, thereby helping to shape a politics
that affects issues that can no longer be understood solely in do-
mestic terms.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994).
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